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Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate
Abstract
In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of
the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis of
time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness
(Zahavi’s concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness
(Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses
Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper provides a new,
more precise vocabulary in which to carry on the debate, in the hopes of bringing it to a mutually
satisfactory resolution. After briefly laying out the terms of the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski debate (Sect.
2), I then elaborate a three-fold distinction in consciousness from the Analyses (Sect. 3) and relate that
back to the issue of objectivity in the debate (Sect. 4). I end by suggesting how this three-fold model from
the Analyses helps us preserve the essentially tripartite structure (as Brough and Sokolowski insist we
do) while not making one of these levels the object of another (in keeping with Zahavi’s critique) (Sect. 5).
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Revisiting the Zahavi-Brough/Sokolowski Debate
There has been much debate in recent Husserlian scholarship on the nature of the
difference between the three levels of consciousness identified in On the Phenomenology
of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Hua X). One of the leading voices in this debate,
Dan Zahavi, seems to suggest that there are actually only two levels of consciousness,
and that two of the levels that Husserl distinguishes are actually one and the same level
viewed from different angles. This is contrasted to the work of other leading Husserlian
commentators, most notably John B. Brough and Robert Sokolowski who maintain the
significance of three distinct levels of consciousness. The “Zahavi v. Brough/
Sokolowski” debate touches on issues of extreme importance to anyone trying to get an
accurate picture of Husserl’s theories of time-consciousness, the transcendental ego, and
constitution, which is to say, to anyone trying to get an accurate picture of Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology.1
A quick glance at Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis:
Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Hua XI) would seem to bolster Zahavi’s claim. In this
work, Husserl discusses the “fundamental stratification” of the life of the ego (Hua XI,
64) into the passive and the active “levels” of consciousness. As such, this work seems to
suggest that there are only two layers of consciousness at work, and hence that Zahavi
must be correct in the debate with Brough and Sokolowski. However, I intend to show
that a more careful examination of the Analyses will show that there are, in fact, three
levels of consciousness at work even in this text. Their grouping into two levels—passive
and active—helps explain an ambiguity that gives rise to the Zahavi v.
1

Indeed, it could be argued that the debate concerning the relationship between the second and third levels
of consciousness mirrors the debate concerning the relationship between transcendental and empirical
subjectivity, and hence is central to any understanding of transcendentality in Husserl.
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Brough/Sokolowski debate, and the analysis provided of the passive sphere and its
relationship to the active sphere in fact helps us better understand the nature of the
difference between all three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X. As such, I hope
to be able to use the Analyses to mediate the debate between Zahavi and
Brough/Sokolowski.
I will begin by summarizing the core issues of the debate and suggesting that what
is at stake in this discussion is a particular issue of objectivity (Section I). Then, I will
suggest a way to map the three levels of consciousness discussed in Hua X onto the two
levels discussed in Hua XI, and vice versa, by suggesting a new three-fold distinction
between active synthesis, passive association, and internal time-consciousness (Section
II). Next, I will discuss the issue of objectivity as it pertains to passive association
(Section III). I will then end by explaining how passive association and internal timeconsciousness can help us make sense of the two levels of constituting consciousness that
are at the heart of the Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski debate (Section IV). In doing so, I
hope to help establish a common ground that could help provide a solution to the problem
raised by this debate.
I. The Zahavi v. Brough/Sokolowski Debate
From the outset, it must be noticed that this “debate” consists mainly of Zahavi’s
critiques of Brough and Sokolowski, followed by his elaboration of what he takes to be a
more accurate account of Husserl’s theory of consciousness.2 At stake is a proper
understanding of what Husserl means by the following passage:

2

Zahavi’s most in-depth discussion of this issue occurs in Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A
Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999); hereafter cited in-text as
SA. He also discusses it in other workds, including: Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity:
Central Topics in Phenomenology (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic, 1998); Zahavi, “Self
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Now that we have studied time-consciousness . . . it would be good to establish
and run through systematically for once the different levels of constitution in their
essential structure. We found:
1. the things of empirical experience in objective time (in connection with
which we would have to distinguish still different levels of empirical
being, which up to this point have not been taken into consideration: the
experienced physical thing belonging to the individual subject, the
intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics);
2. the constituting multiplicities of appearance belonging to different
levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time;
3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness. (Hua X, 73).
Zahavi’s interest in this passage is primarily with Husserl’s theory of selfawareness. He claims that Brough and Sokolowski hold acts to be immediately given,
even prior to reflection, as full blown inner objects distinct from the absolute flow of
consciousness, which is also given to itself (SA, 70). On such an interpretation, Zahavi
claims, the primary givenness of acts of consciousness is an object manifestation,3 which
yields too easily to a “reflection theory” which he is at great pains to disprove.4 The
problem with the Brough-Sokolowski position as Zahavi sees it is that it suggests that the
act is not self-given, but is brought to givenness by something else (i.e., inner timeconsciousness). Hence, it merely “defers” the problem of self-awareness to the level of
inner time-consciousness, which leads, Zahavi contends, either to an infinite regress
problem or is forced to posit “an implicit or intrinsic self-awareness” that can be posited
as easily of the act itself as of some deeper level of consciousness deemed inner timeconsciousness (SA, 70). Hence, this interpretation of the different levels of consciousness

and Consciousness” in Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosohpical and Psychopathological
Perspectives on Self-Experience (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000): 55-74; and Zahavi,
“Phenomenology of Self” in Tilo Kircher and Anthony S. David, (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and
Psychiatry (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 56-75.
3
Using the grammar of vocabulary, Drummond will say that it puts awareness in the case of the accusative,
rather than the genitive case that properly characterizes self-awareness; cf. John J. Drummond, “The
Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational
Approaches to Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 199-220; 199-201.
4
Zahavi lays out his problems with a “reflection theory” of self-awareness in SA, 14-37.
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in Husserl cannot adequately explain the need for the deepest level of the “flow” of
consciousness because it does not adequately explain the connection between this flow
and the acts of consciousness.
Zahavi attempts to solve this problem by linking the absolute flow of
consciousness and the temporally constituted act to Husserl’s notions of functioning and
thematized subjectivity, respectively.5 The main thrust of what Zahavi contends is novel
in his approach is based on the assertion that “Husserl’s investigation of inner timeconsciousness is nothing apart from an investigation into the temporality of prereflective
self-awareness” (SA, 71) because “inner time-consciousness is simply the name for the
prereflective self-awareness of our acts” (SA, 80). In other words, Husserl’s account of
inner time-consciousness is an account of the way in which the acts of consciousness
show themselves to us even as they (also) give us something else (namely, the intentional
object): acts are, therefore, both self- and hetero-manifesting (SA 71-72).6 Hence, in
Zahavi’s opinion, inner time-consciousness is not “a particular intentional act” but “a
pervasive dimension of self-manifestation” that is a passive self-affection (SA, 72).7
Husserl’s account of double intentionality is an elaboration of this model:
“Whereas the flow’s constitution of the duration of its object is called its
Querintentionalität, the flow’s awareness (of) its own streaming unity is called its
Längsintentionalität” (SA, 73). This second “intentionality” cannot be understood as an

5

This, in turn, can also be mapped on to the distinction between prereflective and reflective self-awareness;
SA 71. Later on we will see in what ways the notions of functioning and thematized subjectivity can be
mapped on to the distinction between passive and active strata of consciousness.
6
We will see below that I want to claim that it is passive association, and not inner time-consciousness that
is both self- and hetero-manifesting.
7
Again, we will see below that I want to claim that this realm of passive affection cannot be equated solely
with inner time-consciousness, but must be distinguished between ITC and passive association.
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object-intentionality (Ibid.), but is rather an account of how the intentional objects
constituted in the Querintentionalität show themselves to us primarily (SA, 75).
At the heart of the disagreement between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski lies the
issue of objectivity: in what way can we speak of acts of consciousness as “objects,”
since Zahavi himself concedes that Husserl does, at times, speak of our acts this way (SA,
75)?8 To answer this, we must turn to the relationship between passive and active
syntheses, and how they tie in to the related notions of prereflective and reflective
awareness or prephenomenal and phenomenal being (cf. SA, 78 and Hua X, 129). For
Zahavi, it is precisely, and only, the issue of pre-reflective v. reflective awareness that
makes us able to distinguish between the second and third levels of constitution
elaborated by Husserl (SA, 81). That is, for Zahavi, the two levels differentiated by
Husserl are but two different ways of looking at one and the same thing (SA, 80),
namely, the flow of acts and lived experiences.
II. Are There Two or Three Levels of Consciousness?
But Zahavi’s understanding of the layering of consciousness is not solely binary.
Rather, he seems to admit of a three-fold layering when he states that inner timeconsciousness can make us aware of the following three levels of consciousness:
1. “the transcendent objects in objective time (intentional consciousness)”;
2. “the acts as demarcated temporal objects in subjective time (reflective self-

8

By positing objectivity as the fundamental aspect of the disagreement, I begin to move beyond the realm
of self-awareness that concerns Zahavi primarily so as to highlight the importance for this debate to a wider
Husserlian problematic. Zahavi, and others debating the issue of self-awareness, are not unfamiliar with the
issue of objectivity, and especially the “objectivity” of self-awareness; cf., for example, Drummond, “The
Case(s) of Self-Awareness.”
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awareness)”;9
3. “the stream of consciousness (prereflective self-awareness)” (SA, 81).
However, given that the second and third levels of consciousness are but different modes
of self-awareness, the heart of the matter for Zahavi seems to be a two-fold distinction
between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation.
Zahavi claims that his position is supported by Husserl’s distinction between
functioning and thematized subjectivity. This distinction of Husserl’s plays out in his
analyses of passive and active synthesis. In this work, Husserl claims that the
“fundamental stratification” of consciousness is its split into passive and active levels
(Hua XI, 64), which would seem to support Zahavi’s two-fold focus. However, a closer
examination of Husserl’s analyses in Hua XI shows that there remain at least three levels
of constitution, and hence three levels of consciousness, at work here. Further, the
apparent similarity between Zahavi’s self- and hetero-manifestation and Husserl’s
passive and active syntheses is not so readily apparent once one asks whether the
distinction between functioning (passive) and thematized (active) subjectivity map onto
Zahavi’s pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness (which are two different modes of
self-manifestation) or on to his distinction between self- and hetero-manifestation? If the
latter, then how can we distinguish between the two different modes of selfmanifestation?
To begin to answer these questions, let us turn to Husserl’s account of the
relationship between functioning and thematized subjectivity. Husserl is adamant that
thematized subjectivity presupposes functioning subjectivity: it is only because of passive
9

John B. Brough questions whether acts can, in fact, be distinguished only via reflection, or whether we do
not experience distinct acts prereflexively; cf. the panel on SA at the 2001 meeting of the Husserl Circle
and Drummond’s summary of it in “Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” 216.
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syntheses that the ego is able to actively direct its regard (Hua XI, 120). The essential
elements of passive constitution are associative structure, affection, and attention.10
Attention must be understood as a “tending of the ego toward an intentional object,
toward a unity which ‘appears’ continually in the change of the modes of its givenness”
(EU, 85). This tending occurs because of affecting [Affektion],11 that is, the allure [Reiz],
“the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego” (Hua XI,
148).12 Without this affecting, Husserl is adamant that “there would be no objects at all
and no present organized with objects” (Hua XI, 164).
Being affected can pass over into passive constitution, however, only because of
the process of association, that is, only because what is currently affecting us “recalls” 13
something in the past. This process of passive association works on two levels: first, it
enables us to reproduce things from our past in the present: seeing something now
automatically calls to mind some previous experience. This calling-to-mind is most often
10

Cf. EU §§ 16-18. For more on these elements, cf. also William F. Ryan, S.J. “Passive and Active
Elements in Husserl’s Notion of Intentionality,” The Modern Schoolman LV (November 1977), 37-55.
11
It must be noted that affecting [Affektion] is a living quality belonging to the formal structure of
association and constitution; it is not part of the content of what is being intended (cf. Hua XI, 167-168 and
Ryan, “Passive and Active elements,” 43).
12
Though it must be emphasized that, as with the “attention” under discussion here, this pull is different
from, and in a sense prior to, the ego’s attentively turning toward an object: the pull or allure here is Reiz in
German, which is often translated as “stimulus,” which though perhaps misleading in some contexts is
helpful to us here in indicating the manner or the level on which this “pull” occurs: just as the heat of the
fire is a stimulus that prompts us to remove our hand without the active involvement of the ego but
automatically, reflexively, so the allure of the object stimulates the ego to constitute it (i.e., the object), but
to do so automatically, like a reflex, before the active involvement of the ego.
13
This recalling is purely phenomenological, happening within the epoche and hence distinct from the
recollection of empirical and psychological notions of association; cf. Hua XI, 117-118. For those primarily
familiar with the Logical Investigations, the use of “association” as a key term in Husserl may be
surprising. In LI, Husserl is painstakingly detailed in his critique of empiricist and psychologistic uses of
association. In this secondary sense, association belongs properly in the realm of “indication,” and hence is
accidental, rather than necessary, to the ego (unlike, for example, the eidetic functioning of the ego at work
in expression; cf. LI I.§§ 1-10). Derrida’s reading of Husserl in La Voix et la Phénomène seems to point in
the same direction as the later Husserl: association is essential to the ego’s functioning. The point that
remains to be clarified, however, is whether association, as it works in these later texts, still belongs in the
realm of indication as it does when understood along the lines of the empiricists and psychologists. Husserl
seems to suggest that it does (EU, 78), though this is not the time or place to pursue this question, or its
relation to Derrida’s argument in La Voix et la Phénomène, further.
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done on the basis of similarity: that which is reproduced from the past is in some way like
that which is perceived in the present. This type of reproductive association is “an
absolutely necessary lawful regularity . . . without which a subjectivity could not be”
(Hua XI, 118-119; cf. also Hua XI, 124) because in it “the entire past-consciousness is
co-awakened” (Hua XI, 122). Reproductive association enables our present
consciousness to be united to our past-consciousness, and thus makes possible the
historicity of the subject.
This historicity, in its turn, is shown to be necessary for the life of the subject
through the second, “higher” level of association: expectations. Expectations are closely
related to apperception, and hence to perception and the primary constitution of objects as
what they are. My previous experiences are retained in a horizon “of actual and possible
expectations” (Hua XI, 119) that enables me to experience any object as the object it is.
For example, I perceive the chair as a chair, though I only perceive one side of the chair
at this time. How can I do this? Because I have a horizon of expectations that enables me
to expect, with varying degrees of certainty, how the other sides of the chair could be
perceived if I were to make those other sides available to me in a primary presentation
(i.e., by walking around so that I could see the back of the chair directly). Because of my
past-consciousness, I am able to expect other, currently non-present sides of the chair,
and this allows me to apperceive what I see as a chair, a thing like other chairs. Without
this horizon of expectations, I would not be able to apperceive things in the world.
This two-fold association must be kept distinct from internal time-consciousness.
While internal time-consciousness is a necessary presupposition of associative syntheses
(cf. Hua XI, § 27), the two are not the same. Association is needed to “awaken” the
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associated objects, as retention and (especially) protention are empty. Without
association, Husserl claims, internal time-consciousness would be “meaningless” (Hua
XI, 125) because it abstracts from content, and hence cannot give us “any idea of the
necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the
presents” (Hua XI, 128). However, without internal time-consciousness and the
temporalization of consciousness that it makes possible, the idea of association, either
reproductive or expectative, would be impossible. Hence, association is founded upon,
but distinct from, internal time-consciousness.
But association must also be kept distinct from the actively intentional acts of the
ego. Association is a passive synthesis, as Husserl points out time and time again, and as
such is distinct from active syntheses.14 Indeed, the “specific intentions” of active
consciousness arise from, and hence presuppose, passive syntheses (Hua XI, 118).
We are left, then, with three distinct levels of constitution:
1. active syntheses, i.e., specific, egoically-directed intentional acts;
2. passive associations;
3. internal time-consciousness.
The three distinct levels of constitution at work in the analyses of passive and
active synthesis are reminiscent of the three levels of constitution in Husserl that we
discussed earlier (from Hua X, 73). If the parallel between the two lists holds, a
clarification of the distinction between internal time-consciousness and passive
association would help to mediate the debate between Zahavi and Brough/ Sokolowski.
In order to clarify this distinction, however, we must first examine it in light of the issue

14

Cf., for example, Hua XI, 120 where Husserl speaks of passivity as “the founding level of all the activelogical processes.”
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of objectivity, which we have already stated is the key issue at stake in the debate
between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski. In turning to an analysis of objectivity and
passive synthesis,15 then, we will hopefully be able to see a bit more clearly how and why
objectivity is a central problem in the debate.
III. Objects and Passive Synthesis
A. Objects and Objectlike Formations
Association, in giving us things in the world, precisely does not yield for us
objects. Rather, by bringing together similar hyletic data, association enables us to form
“objectlike formations” [Gegenständlichkeit].16 These objectlike formations must still be
acted upon by the ego to become fully formed objects. Specifically, they must be judged,
the similarities held before the thematizing gaze and understood in their essences. It is
only by passing through the tribunal of judgment that beings can appear for me as objects
(Hua XVII, 69).
Passing through the tribunal of judgment, then, marks the move from passive to
active synthesis as a “quantam leap,” a qualitative and not merely a quantitative
difference.17 The difference is between the unthematized thing of experience and the
object of thought characterized by judgment. It is only with this last step, that of (active)
judgment, that we can speak properly of objects (EU, 81 n.1). Properly speaking, within
the sphere of passive synthesis, we have only tendencies, habitualities,18 horizons.

15

Throughout, I use passive synthesis as a wider umbrella term, including both time-consciousness and
passive association. This is to mark the fundamental difference between these two levels and the level of
active synthesis.
16
I follow Steinbock in translating Gegenständlichkeit as “objectlike formations;” cf. translator’s
introduction to Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, xlii.
17
Ryan, “Passive and Active Elements,” 46.
18
Cf. Fink and Husserl, Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method
translated by Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); 10. For an exploration of this
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B. Objectivity in Passive Association
Returning to the question of objectivity in the passive sphere, then, we see that we
can speak, if not of objects then at least of objectivity (including objectlike formations),
in the passive sphere. In fact, one can distinguish at least three different dimensions of
objectivity in Husserl’s account of passive synthesis: individual, intersubjective, and
cultural.19 The first is a weaker dimension of objectivity, limited as it is to a “single
perceiving Ego-subject” (Hua III, 316-317). This is the type of objectivity attained by a
single stream of consciousness and its “ideal perceptual multiplicities” (Ibid.). Here we
see the most rudimentary ability of the subject to see unity in multiplicity. This
objectivity is moved to a higher level when the object can be intersubjectively verified: in
discussion, I can come to see that my perception of the object is like or unlike others’
perceptions of it. The more agreement we can come to about the object, the greater its
level of objectivity. Because it has been tested in the fire of multiple subjects’
experiences, this level of objectivity is higher (more accurate, more verified) than that
which is held by one subject alone.
But this model of intersubjective verification requires dialogue between different
subjects, and therefore requires the involvement of active egos. It seems to be no longer
passive, but active. But there is a non-active way for other subjects to be involved in the
ego’s constitution of objectlike formations: the cultural. Simply put, previous cultural
achievements are “virtualized” (Hua VI, 372-3), and can then be sedimented in the

idea, cf. Anthony Steinbock, Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1995).
19
For a more in-depth analysis of these dimensions, cf. Paul Gyllenhammer, “Three Dimensions of
Objectivity in Husserl’s Account of Passive Synthesis,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
Vol. 35 No. 2 (May 2004), 180-200.
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subject’s horizons.20 That is, not just my own but also other people’s cultural
achievements (including achievements of knowledge and judgment) become part of my
experience of the world, and so can be recalled in association and used in the passive
constitution of objectlike formations (cf. Hua XV, 214, 234-5).21 This is necessary,
Husserl claims, to the constitution of ideal objects, which have a “persisting existence . . .
even during periods in which the inventor and his fellow are no longer wakefully so
related [to the object]” (Hua VI, 372). This is to say that ideal objects have a “continuingto-be even when no one has . . . realized them in self-evidence” (Ibid.). Ideal objects,
then, transcend mere historical occurrences or facts, even as they are based upon them:
ideal objects are types of experience that are clearly recognized by individuals as a
“guiding norm for future engagements with the world.”22 As guiding norms for future
engagement, they become candidates for sedimentation into the horizons of expectation
discussed above.
C. The “Object” of Time-Consciousness
We have already shown above that time-consciousness and passive synthesis must
be kept distinct: passive synthesis provides the content that gives time-consciousness
meaning, while time-consciousness provides the temporalization of the subject that
founds passive synthesis.23 But can we mark this distinction beyond the seemingly
Kantian language of form and content? I think we can, because the two levels of
constitution seem to correspond to two distinct accounts of fulfillment: time20

Husserl’s prime example here is writing, a point that Derrida will make much of in his Introduction to the
French translation of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry (cf. Edmund Husserl, L'Origine de la géométrie trans.
with introduction by Jacques Derrida. Paris: PUF 1962).
21
Cf. also Gyllenhammer, “Three Dimensions of Objectivity,” 194, 199 n.37.
22
Gyllenhammer, “Three Dimensions of Objectivity,” 193.
23
In Husserl’s words, we could say that, as a “lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly
belongs to consciousness in general” (Hua XI, 117), passive synthesis must conform to time-consciousness,
the “universal, formal framework . . . in which all other possible syntheses must participate” (Hua XI, 125).
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consciousness achieves the general fulfillment of retained protentions and protended
retentions in non-intuitive differentiation (cf. Hua XXXIII, 21-27), while passive
synthesis achieves the particular fulfillment of the domain of intuition (Hua XXXIII, 3039; 227ff.).
The “objects” of the two levels of constitution then are distinct: timeconsciousness is fulfilled by the retention of previous protentions,24 that is, by elements
seemingly within the realm of time-consciousness,25 while passive synthesis is seemingly
fulfilled by the intuition of the world, that is, of the amalgam of things in the world and
my horizons of experience with them.26 As such, the “objectlike formations” of passive
synthesis are simultaneously directed at the world and within the self (its retentional
horizons, etc.). As directed toward our horizons and partially constitutive of those
horizons, passive synthesis achieves a small level of self-manifestation (the manifestation
of the horizons of which they are themselves a part), while still maintaining,
simultaneously, a measure of hetero-manifestation (the manifestation of the objectlike
formations of the things in the environing world). This would seem to suggest that the
second level of constitution marks, not a borderline between self- and heteromanifestation (as Zahavi suggests), but rather a transition that is also a connection

24

Cf. Ms. L I 15, 24a-b: “The earlier consciousness is protention (i.e., an intention “directed” at what
comes later) and the following retention would then be retention of the earlier retention that is characterized
at the same time as [its] protention. This newly arriving retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with
its protentional tendency and at the same time fulfills it, but it fulfills it in such a way that going through
this fulfillment is a protention of the next phase”; as translated in Lanei Rodemeyer, “Developments in the
Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Analysis of Protention,” in Donn Welton (ed), The New Husserl: A
Critical Reader (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003): 125-154; 131. This
constitutes an advance, of sorts, on Husserl’s earlier claims that retentions retain retentions (Hua X, 81).
25
In this way, time-consciousness achieves the “self-relatedness” (Selbstbezogenheit, Hua XXXIII, 207)
necessary for the stream of absolute consciousness.
26
There is also a distinction in intentionality that must be accounted for here, that between
Längsintentionalität and Querintentionalität, between the more general “tending toward” of Drummond’s
intentionalityD and the more specific “directedness to an object” of Drummond’s intentionalityO; cf.
Drummond, “Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” 217; and SA, 73.
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between them,27 and hence not only a distinction between “levels,” but also the
maintenance of a single—if complex—account of self-awareness.
IV. Mediating the Debate
We have so far been at pains to show: 1) a parallel between the three levels of
constituting consciousness in Hua X and the three levels of consciousness discussed in
Hua XI (i.e., active synthesis, passive synthesis, internal time-consciousness); and 2) that
the second level of the latter list (i.e., passive synthesis) contains a certain level of
objectivity that is distinct from the objectivity of the first or third levels. What remains is
to relate this back to the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski on the levels of
consciousness in Husserl.
John Drummond has said that “[a]ny resolution to the dispute between Brough
and Zahavi would have to account for how we might have two ‘dimensions’ or a
differentiation within consciousness while preserving a single, albeit perhaps complex,
notion of self-awareness.”28 The suggestion here is that perhaps the distinction between
passive association and internal time-consciousness would enable such a differentiation
without lapsing into the “reflection” theory which multiplies self-awarenesses.
We can maintain a single self-awareness only if we are able to avoid turning
passive syntheses into an object of internal time-consciousness. I think that we have been
able to do this without losing the ability to distinguish between distinct passive syntheses,
and hence to distinguish between discrete experiences. In the first place, the “object” of

27

This would suggest the possibility of developing an explanation of the “parallel” between transcendental
and empirical subjectivity, if the transcendental stakes of the debate were clearly elaborated in note 1
above.
28
John J. Drummond, “The Case(s) of Self-Awareness,” in Self-Representational Approaches to
Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006): 199-220;
216.
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the “acts” of time-consciousness is only time-consciousness itself, and therefore, as long
as passive association is distinct from time-consciousness, it cannot be the “object” of
time-consciousness.
Secondly, the “constituting multiplicities” of passive synthesis (i.e., the
associations themselves, and not the products of those association) provide us a distinct
account of objectivity, namely the Gegenstandlichkeit of the sensible, environing world,29
which distinguishes this type of objectivity from both the strong notion of the object that
occurs in active synthesis and the more “formal” striving character of protentive timeconsciousness (Hua XI, 73). Hence, there is a distinction between passive association and
internal time-consciousness such that they cannot be the same thing (and hence, passive
association cannot be the “object” of time-consciousness).
But this may not entirely solve the question of whether the passive syntheses are
themselves objectivities, or whether they merely yield objectivities, even if it does seem
to answer whether passive synthesis are the objects of time-consciousness.30 This is a
more vexing question; I would want to contend that passive syntheses are themselves
objectivities (though certainly not objects) to the extent that they themselves, as distinct
acts, are part of our sedimented horizons. The move from individual to intersubjective
and cultural levels of objectivity would seem to entail an analysis of the effectiveness of
our synthetic acts themselves: when presented with similar stimuli, do I consistently
synthesize the world in the same way as do others? Even within individual objectivity

29

That is, the world of expectations that must be kept distinct from the “anticipations” characteristic of
active synthesis, and from the protention of time-consciousness; for more on this distinction, cf. my
dissertation, “Futurity in Phenomenology,” especially Part One, “Futurity in Constitution and
Transcendental Subjectivity.”
30
Here again, we take the discussion past the focus exclusively on a theory of self-awareness out to larger
philosophical issues.
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and association, there is the question of the reliability of the syntheses themselves: am I,
to borrow language from Analytic epistemology, functioning properly?31 That is, when
tendencies are at work in passive association, at least one of these tendencies must also
apply to the constituting acts themselves: not only does some stimulus recall to mind
previous, similar stimuli, but it also recalls that previous occurrences of similar stimuli
have tended to yield productive expectational capabilities. Even if the effectiveness of
these acts can only be judged in the realm of active synthesis via reflection (and
therefore, perhaps, by being objectified, strongly speaking), this would seem to
presuppose an already-existent, that is to say, in the language of self-awareness,
prereflective, objectlike-formation, as no object can exist (in active synthesis) without a
prior objectlike-formation being constituted in passive synthesis. There must, it would
seem, be a certain degree of objectivity to our acts, even if they are not, strictly speaking,
objects (and especially not the objects of time-consciousness). It is my hope that this
distinction in objectivity will enable us to preserve the distinction between “dimensions”
of consciousness without resorting to a “reflection theory” that makes one dimension the
object of the other, and hence multiplies self-awarenesses.
Conclusion
I disagree, then, with Zahavi’s elaboration of the levels of consciousness that
provides the justification for his reduction to two distinct levels of consciousness (selfand hetero-manifesting).32 This manifests itself in a disagreement with some of Zahavi’s
claims regarding inner time-consciousness, for example, that it is both self- and heteromanifesting (SA 71-72), and that it is “simply the name for the prereflective self-

31
32

Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Though I concede that my position remains consistent with Zahavi’s on several important points.
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awareness of our acts” (SA, 80) because it is equivalent to “a pervasive dimension of
self-manifestation” that is a passive self-affection (SA, 72). In contrast to these claims, I
have instead suggested a three-fold elaboration (active synthesis, passive synthesis, timeconsciousness) that I hope clarifies the levels of constituting consciousness discussed by
Husserl in Hua X. It is passive association, I contend, that is both self- and heteromanifesting, and hence is an essential aspect of the passive dimension of selfmanifestation that must be kept distinct from the “flow” of inner time-consciousness.33
While it is my hope that this suggestion will begin to resolve some core issues of
the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski (i.e., concerning the “objectivity” of
the second level and the need to distinguish it from time-consciousness), my more modest
hope is simply that this new attempt at clarification will begin to mediate (rather than
resolve) the debate by providing a neutral vocabulary within which proponents of each
side can exchange their views.

Thank you.34

33

By trying to move beyond the issue of self-awareness through recourse to the Analyses, I have also tried
to show, contra Zahavi’s claim on SA 81, that the issue of pre-reflective v. reflective awareness is not the
only thing that can make us able to distinguish between the second and third levels of constitution
elaborated by Husserl.
34
Research for this paper was made possible in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC), whose support is herein gratefully acknowledged.
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